In Jones v. Starz Entertainment, LLC, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered whether consolidation of mass arbitration proceedings over an objection of a plaintiff amounts to a refusal to arbitrate within the meaning of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). The Ninth Circuit decided that it does not.

Background

Petitioner created a Starz account to watch video content, accepting the applicable Terms of Use. The Terms of Use contained an arbitration clause providing that all disputes, controversies, and claims arising out of or relating to these Terms of Use “will be determined pursuant to the mediation and arbitration procedures of JAMS.” The arbitration was meant to take place “in accordance with [JAMS] comprehensive rules and procedures” (“JAMS Rules”). The Terms of Use further provided that both parties “agree that each may bring claims against the other only in [their] individual capacity, and not as a plaintiff or class member in any purported class or representative proceeding.”

In January 2023, Petitioner initiated JAMS arbitration against Starz alleging that Starz violated, among other laws, the Video Privacy Protection Act by disclosing Petitioner’s identity and her watched videos to third-party advertising and analytics companies. Petitioner also requested that a mediator be appointed for the dispute but the parties disagreed on the allocation of mediation fees.

In June 2023, Petitioner informed JAMS that the parties were in a deadlock over the payment of the mediation fees, and, as such, the individual arbitration should be commenced.

Around that time, other plaintiffs (represented by the same law firm as the Petitioner) had initiated approximately 7,300 similar arbitrations against Starz, alleging the breach of privacy laws. Starz requested that the proceedings be consolidated into a single arbitration. Subsequently, JAMS ordered consolidation over the Petitioner’s objection.

Following the consolidation, JAMS undertook to appoint a sole arbitrator to hear the case. However, the Plaintiffs (excluding the Petitioner) repeatedly served notices of disqualification against the appointed sole arbitrators. While JAMS proposed that the Plaintiffs petition the court to appoint an arbitrator, this path has not been executed.  

In January 2024, the Petitioner requested in writing that the Respondent “stipulate to the individual arbitration as agreed.” The Respondent refused this request.

District Court proceedings

On January 31, 2024, the Petitioner initiated proceedings before the United States District Court for the Central District of California seeking to compel individual arbitration with Starz.

The Petitioner’s petition argued that Starz’s refusal to initiate “individual arbitration” with the Petitioner amounted to a refusal to arbitrate within the meaning of the FAA. The Petitioner further argued that the mass consolidation generated “an endless procedural loop,” preventing the appointment of the arbitrator and, thus, depriving the Petitioner of the right to arbitrate the dispute.

Starz opposed, filing a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the Petitioner failed to state a claim under the FAA.

On March 11, 2024, the District Court granted Starz’s motion to dismiss [1].

The Court reasoned that:

• The FAA allows a party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another party to arbitrate under a written arbitration agreement to petition the district court to compel arbitration in the manner provided in the arbitration agreement [2]. Thus, to successfully seek court assistance, a party must refuse to arbitrate and the other party must be aggrieved by such refusal.
• In this case, Petitioner did not show that Starz failed, neglected, or refused to arbitrate. The arbitration commenced upon Petitioner’s demand, both parties participated in communication with JAMS ever since, and the parties have been participating in the process of arbitrator selection.
• This dispute was not about a refusal to arbitrate, but about how the arbitration should proceed. This could not be a ground for a petition to compel arbitration.
• The fact that the proceedings had been consolidated with other cases into a single arbitration was not enough to find a refusal to arbitrate under the plain language of the Terms of Use. The JAMS Rules include the possibility to consolidate proceedings unless the arbitration agreement or applicable law provides otherwise. In this case, the arbitration agreement did not exclude consolidation. Thus, the consolidation could not have aggrieved the Petitioner.
• Other procedural issues raised in the petition, such as the payment of arbitration fees should be left to the arbitrator hearing the case, as courts have a limited role under the FAA.

The Petitioner appealed.

Ninth Circuit proceedings

On February 28, 2025, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision denying the petition to compel arbitration [3].

The Ninth Circuit observed that:

• Petitioners did not prove that Starz failed, neglected, or refused to arbitrate the dispute. Starz was active in the arbitration, replying to the JAMS correspondence (for example regarding consolidation), participating in the arbitrator selection process, and expressing readiness to participate in the arbitration.
• The fact that Starz urged JAMS to consolidate the proceedings was not enough to find that Starz refused to arbitrate. The decision on consolidation had been undertaken by JAMS, not Starz, so its issuance could not amount to a refusal to arbitrate by Starz.
• Moreover, the arbitration agreement binding the parties did not preclude consolidation or require “individual arbitration.” It prohibited “class or representative” proceedings which is different from consolidation of arbitrations. Consolidated proceedings remain separate, bilateral proceedings in which each claimant brings their claims in their individual capacity.
• By incorporating the JAMS Rules into their agreement, the parties agreed to the consolidation of arbitrations, as the JAMS Rules explicitly provide for such a possibility.
• This case is different from the recent Heckman v. Live Nation Entertainment, Inc. case [4]. In Heckman, the arbitration agreement excluded the rights of plaintiffs to participate in proceedings, allowing only few bellwether cases to proceed. This rendered the Heckman arbitration clause unconscionable, but the current case did not share these issues. Here, Petitioner’s right to pursue claims in arbitration was not infringed.
• Furthermore, the Petitioner may raise the issue of violation of her contractual rights due to consolidation with the arbitrator, who may revisit the relevant consolidation decision. Also, the Petitioner may end the “endless procedural loop” by petitioning the court to appoint an arbitrator.
• In addition, the case did not present an issue of arbitrability, as none of the parties challenges the validity of the arbitration agreement. The fact that the agreed arbitration rules provide that the decision on consolidation may be issued by the institution administrating the proceedings did not present an issue of arbitrability.
• Finally, the Petitioner’s attempt to circumvent the agreement to arbitrate by claiming the clause is unconscionable was unfounded. A party cannot seek to change the terms of the arbitration agreement through claims of unconscionability, without invalidating the arbitration agreement. Here, the Petitioner did not want the arbitration agreement invalidated. Instead, Petitioner sought “to chisel” it into a different agreement, which was inappropriate.

Relevance

The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Jones v. Starz Entertainment, LLC holds significant implications for the management of mass arbitration proceedings:

• The decision affirms the authority of arbitration institutions to consolidate arbitrations, a feature commonly found in leading arbitration rules. Not only the JAMS Rules but also others, such as the ICC Arbitration Rules or the SIAC Arbitration Rules, provide that in certain circumstances, the arbitration institution may decide to consolidate arbitrations. It serves as a reminder for parties selecting an arbitration seat within the Ninth Circuit’s jurisdiction that challenging an arbitration institution’s authority to consolidate arbitrations may be difficult.
• The clear distinction between class arbitration and the consolidation of individual arbitrations should be considered by parties when drafting their arbitration agreements. Parties should include explicit language in their contracts to ensure that any limitations on class arbitration or consolidation accurately reflect their intentions, as they will not be interpreted broadly.
• The decision addresses the challenges posed by mass arbitration strategies, where thousands of similar claims are filed simultaneously, potentially burdening companies with substantial arbitration fees. The court’s decision endorses a more effective framework for managing such claims.

---

[1] Jones v. Starz Ent., LLC, No. 5:24-cv-00206, ECF No. 34 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2024).

[2] 9 U.S.C. § 4.

[3] Jones v. Starz Ent., LLC, No. 24-1645, (9th Cir. Feb. 28, 2025).

[4] Heckman v. Live Nation Ent., Inc., 120 F.4th 670 (9th Cir. 2024).